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ADVICE AND COMPLICITY
MATTHEW A. SMITH†
ABSTRACT
The practice of law occurs at the boundary between the criminal
law and the rules of professional responsibility. In their respective
definitions of lawyers’ complicity in their clients’ crimes, these two
systems of rules conflict. The rules of professional responsibility
exonerate a lawyer for advising a client in committing a crime if the
lawyer acted in good faith; however, the criminal law convicts the
same lawyer of aiding and abetting the client’s crime even if the
lawyer believed that the conduct in question was legal. As a result of
this conflict, choosing which standard of complicity to apply in a
given case risks undermining the purposes and interests served by the
system of rules whose standard is not chosen. Perhaps worse, the lack
of a consistent standard of complicity for lawyers acting as advisors
forecloses all opportunities to reach a common understanding of
when lawyers will be held liable for advising on legally dubious
conduct. The legal profession’s ethical crises over lawyers’ roles in the
“torture memo” controversy, the Enron scandal, and the Kaye
Scholer affair demonstrate the confusion that has ensued from the
absence of an adequate concept of complicity. This Note uses these
crises to examine the conflict between the concepts of complicity
embodied in the professional rules and the criminal law. It then seeks
to resolve this conflict by exploring whether a coherent concept of
lawyers’ complicity can preserve the principles and purposes served
by both systems while differentiating the innocent advisor from the
culpable accomplice.
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INTRODUCTION
The theory of complicity describes the circumstances in which
1
“one person . . . becomes liable for the crime of another.” The basic
doctrine consists of two elements: first, the alleged accomplice must
take an action that facilitates the primary actor’s pursuit of a
2
potentially criminal goal; second, the accomplice must act with the
3
purpose of enabling the primary actor to achieve the goal. If the goal
pursued by the primary actor is a crime, and the primary actor
4
accomplishes it, then the person facilitating the conduct in question
5
6
becomes an accomplice. Unless a mistake of law would be a viable
defense to the primary actor’s crime, the accomplice’s belief that the
goal pursued by the primary actor is legal does not mitigate the
7
accomplice’s culpability.
Lawyers are professional facilitators. They engage routinely in
helping people accomplish their purposes. As advisors, lawyers are
called upon to render candid opinions on how clients may pursue
8
their goals within the boundaries of the law. According to the rules of

1. Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause, and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of
Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 336 (1985).
2. See id. at 342 (“Two kinds of actions render the secondary party liable for the criminal
actions of the primary party: intentionally influencing the decision of the primary party to
commit a crime, and intentionally helping the primary actor commit the crime . . . .”).
3. See id. at 346 (“[The accomplice] must act with the intention of influencing or assisting
the primary actor to engage in the conduct constituting the crime.”); see also WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 576 (2d ed. 1986) (“[Accomplice liability
consists of giving] assistance . . . with the intent thereby to promote or facilitate commission of
the crime.”).
4. See Kadish, supra note 1, at 355 (“By its nature, the doctrine of complicity, like
causation, requires a result. It is not a doctrine of inchoate liability.”).
5. See id. at 337 (“[The accomplice’s] liability is derivative, which is to say, it is incurred by
virtue of a violation of law by the primary party to which the secondary party contributed.”).
6. “Mistake of law” refers to a defendant’s erroneous belief that the conduct for which the
defendant is being prosecuted is not criminal. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 412–13
(outlining the doctrine of mistake of law). A mistake of law is not a defense to most crimes. Id.
7. See Kadish, supra note 1, at 349 (“[T]o be liable as an accomplice in the crime
committed by the principal, the secondary party must act with the mens rea required by the
definition of the principal’s crime.”); see also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 579
(“Generally, it may be said that accomplice liability exists when . . . [the accomplice’s] purpose is
to encourage or assist another in the commission of a crime as to which the accomplice has the
requisite mental state.”).
8. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 22.2 (3d ed. 2009) (“[L]awyers contribute to the peaceful running of a lawful society by
advising their clients what the law is, and by carrying out their client’s wishes within the bounds
of law.”).
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professional responsibility governing the legal profession, a lawyer
may not advise a client in regard to activity that the lawyer knows to
9
be criminal. But the rules do not penalize a lawyer who advises a
client in an effort to determine the legality of the client’s intended
10
purposes if the lawyer acts in good faith.
This Note argues that the criminal law and the professional rules
embody conflicting concepts of lawyers’ complicity in their clients’
criminal activity. Under the criminal law’s doctrine of complicity, a
lawyer who gives advice to a client to facilitate the client’s purpose,
with knowledge of what the client intends to do, becomes an
11
accomplice if the client’s conduct is later determined to be criminal.
The lawyer’s reasoned belief that the client’s purpose was not
criminal does not exonerate the lawyer unless that belief would also
12
excuse the client. In practice, this occurs rarely, because a mistake of
13
law is not a defense to most crimes. By contrast, under the
professional rules, the lawyer’s belief as to the legality of the client’s
conduct may determine whether the lawyer committed professional
14
misconduct. Under the professional rules, a good-faith belief that
the client’s purpose was legal is exculpatory. Under the criminal law,
that belief excuses nothing.
As a result of this conflict, the professional rules acquit when the
criminal law convicts. This conflict is not of merely theoretical
relevance. Although the criminal law and the professional rules are
separate systems, both seek to govern the behavior of lawyers acting
9. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009) (“A lawyer shall not counsel
a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent . . . .”); see also HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 5.3 (“Rule 1.2 seeks to assure that
lawyers not become accomplices in criminal or fraudulent conduct.”). According to the ABA,
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have been adopted in some form by all but one state.
See Am. Bar Ass’n, Model Rules of Professional Conduct Dates of Adoption, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha_states.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (“[A] lawyer . . . may counsel or
assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or
application of the law.”); see also id. R. 8.4 cmt. 4 (“A lawyer may refuse to comply with an
obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists.”).
11. See Kadish, supra note 1, at 346 (“[I]f it was the purpose of the one giving the advice to
influence the other to commit the crime, he is an accomplice . . . .”).
12. See id. at 349 (describing the mens rea of accomplice liability).
13. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 412–13 (noting that mistake of law is “ordinarily
not a recognized defense”).
14. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (permitting lawyers to assist clients
in a good-faith effort to determine the “scope, meaning or application” of the law); see also id.
R. 8.4 cmt. 4 (“A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good
faith belief that no valid obligation exists.”).
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as advisors. Lawyers may adhere to the stricter notion of complicity
embodied in the criminal law and risk unnecessarily limiting the
circumstances in which they may give advice. In the alternative, they
may adhere to the more permissive good-faith standard of the
professional norms, at the risk of being prosecuted as accomplices
without the benefit of a good-faith defense.
This inconsistency between the criminal law and the professional
rules also undermines public expectations of lawyers’ behavior. If the
criminal-law standard of complicity prevails, the public gains the
assurance of holding lawyers accountable for their complicit actions
according to the same legal standards that apply to the general public.
At the same time, the criminal standard risks deterring lawyers from
giving socially constructive advice out of fear of being prosecuted
should it turn out that, contrary to the lawyer’s legal opinion, the
client’s conduct is actually criminal. But if the professional rules’
concept of complicity governs, the public must accept that lawyers
possess a special immunity to prosecution for actions taken as
accomplices if those actions are taken in good faith. The legal
community would bear the burden of justifying such a self-interested
exception.
This Note begins by considering contexts in which the criminal
law’s doctrine of complicity has been applied to lawyers acting as
advisors. In particular, Part I examines how the criminal law
governing lawyers’ advice in the context of fraud prosecutions
effectively accommodates the professional rules’ exemption for
advice given in good faith. The fraud example provides a model for
reconciling the disparity between the criminal law’s and the
professional rules’ basic doctrines of complicity. Part II discusses the
perceptions of lawyers’ complicity that appeared during three major
crises in the legal profession. The standard of complicity that emerged
from these crises uses a distinction between the lawyer’s separate
roles as advisor and as advocate to draw the line between complicity
and appropriate legal advice. Unlike the law of fraud, the emerging
standard does not possess clear mens rea requirements that prevent
conflict with the professional rules’ protection for the lawyer who acts
in good faith.
Part III explains why consistency between the models of
complicity found in the professional rules and criminal laws is
necessary to avoid undermining the values served by either system. In
light of this discussion, Part IV considers how the distinction between
advising and advocacy could be implemented as a general standard
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for lawyers’ complicity outside the context of existing specialized
rules, such as fraud. It examines how the professional rules’ excuse
for advice given in good faith could be applied to eliminate the
conflict between the professional rules’ and the criminal law’s
differing conceptions of complicity.
I. TWO CATEGORIES OF CRIMINAL COMPLICITY
Prosecutions of lawyers who advise clients on criminal activity
can be classified in two broad categories that correspond to the
complexity of the client’s underlying crime. In one category, the
client’s criminality is relatively clear: the client commits perjury,
willfully disobeys a court order, or lies to immigration officials, and
the client does so with the lawyer’s encouragement or approval. The
crimes themselves are simple, and no legal expertise is necessary to
understand that the act in question is illegal. Due to the obvious
illegality of the act, prosecuting the lawyer for advising the client to
commit that act is uncontroversial under both the criminal law and
15
the professional rules.
In the second category, the client’s offense is more complex, and
the lawyer may be prosecuted for aiding an act whose criminality
depends on a more difficult question of legal judgment. In these
cases, there is a greater risk of conflict between the professional rules’
and the criminal law’s respective concepts of complicity. Due to the
nuanced legal questions that appear in complex cases, lawyers are
more able to argue that, according to their reasoned interpretation of
the law, they believed that the client’s conduct was legal. When the
determination of guilt or innocence turns on the integrity of the
lawyer’s legal judgment, it is easier to cast that lawyer’s decision as
having been made in good faith.
The crime of aiding and abetting fraud offers an example of this
16
dynamic. The criminal laws proscribing fraud contain specific mens
rea requirements that augment the basic doctrine of complicity and
avoid the conflict that would otherwise emerge with the professional

15. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) annot. (6th ed. 2007)
(citing lawyer discipline cases involving violations of court orders and other clearly illegal
offenses).
16. See Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 688 (2005)
(discussing legal advisors’ susceptibility to allegations of fraud). See generally Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35
U. MIAMI L. REV. 669 (1981) (discussing the scope of attorneys’ liability for client fraud).
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rules’ standard of good faith. For example, the criminal provisions of
17
18
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
make it a criminal offense to willfully or knowingly violate their
19
substantive provisions. A lawyer who knowingly violates any of the
securities laws can hardly be imagined to have acted in good faith.
Although stopping short of offering a broad good-faith defense
20
against a fraud prosecution, these mens rea elements require that
the defendant possessed a mental state that is incompatible with good
faith.
21
United States v. Benjamin illustrates how securities fraud
statutes eliminate the conflict between the models of complicity in the

17. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006); see also id. § 77x (providing
criminal penalties for “[a]ny person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this
subchapter”).
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78oo (2006 & Supp. III 2009); see
also id. § 78ff(a) (providing criminal penalties for “any person who willfully and knowingly”
misrepresents a material fact in an Exchange Act statement).
19. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1347
(4th ed. 2001) (“All of the SEC statutes make it a criminal offense ‘willfully’ to violate any of
their provisions, any related rule, or (with respect to the last four acts in the series) any related
order.”). In SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978), the court
upheld aiding-and-abetting liability for lawyers advising on securities transactions, holding
counsel liable for ignoring the materiality of information that was omitted from a shareholder
proxy statement and for subsequently failing to interfere with a related merger. See id. at 713
(“The record amply demonstrates the ‘knowledge of the fraud, and not merely the
undisclosed material facts’ that is required to meet this element of secondary liability.” (quoting
Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 759 (2d Cir. 1977))). The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.), instructed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
prosecute violations of the Exchange Act, codifying a broad range of criminal prohibitions that
apply to counsel advising on a securities transaction. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (providing for
prosecution of persons who “knowingly provide substantial assistance” to violators of the
securities laws); Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008)
(recognizing that “Congress . . . directed prosecution of aiders and abettors by the SEC” in
§ 78t(e)). The precedent established in Stoneridge continues to haunt lawyers advising on
disclosure-related matters involving securities. See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d
507, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (questioning why the SEC did not seek penalties from lawyers who
prepared disclosure statements omitting allegedly material information in a merger transaction).
Courts have interpreted the relevant section of the PSLRA as requiring that an aider and
abettor have actual knowledge of a violation of the Exchange Act rather than allowing liability
for recklessness by secondary actors. See, e.g., SEC v. Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d 459, 501
(D.N.J. 2008) (requiring actual knowledge of a securities-law violation, as opposed to reckless
action, and citing cases that imposed the same requirement).
20. See United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779, 781–82 (2d Cir. 1968) (rejecting appellants’
argument that they could not be convicted of violating the Securities Exchange Act because
they were not aware of its registration requirements).
21. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964).
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22

criminal law and the professional rules. Martin Benjamin, a lawyer,
was convicted of willfully conspiring to sell unregistered securities in
concert with Milton Mende, Benjamin’s client and the principal
23
promoter of the scheme. Benjamin and his co-conspirators obtained
corporate assets that were sold in 1919, prior to the enactment of the
24
Securities Act of 1933. Section 3(a)(1) of the Securities Act
contained an exemption from its registration requirements for shares
of companies that were sold prior to or within sixty days of May 27,
25
1933, provided that those shares were not sold again by a new issuer.
Mende sought to take advantage of the exemption for shares issued
prior to 1933 by purchasing all of the corporation’s outstanding shares
26
and selling them under the name of a new corporation. Benjamin
supported Mende’s efforts by drafting letters to potential purchasers
asserting that the shares fell within the exemption and therefore were
27
not subject to the registration requirement.
Arguably, Benjamin may not have understood that Mende’s
acquisition of the pre-1933 shares made the subsequent sale of those
shares a new issuance that was not subject to the exemption in
Section 3(a)(1). Provided that Benjamin was laboring under a
mistaken belief about the applicability of the exemption, he may be
said to have been acting in good faith. But the “willfulness” criterion
of the Securities Act fraud provision foreclosed this argument by
requiring evidence that Benjamin actually knew of the registration
requirements and also knew that Mende’s actions rendered Section
28
3(a)(1) inapplicable to the new share offering. Evidence was found
to support both requirements, leaving Benjamin little room to argue
that he acted in good faith.

22. Cf. Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Primary Liability of Securities Lawyers, 50 SMU
L. REV. 383, 398 (1996) (invoking Benjamin as a “behavior-shaping judicial statement[]”). See
generally LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 176 (noting that the SEC frequently quotes from
Benjamin in enforcement actions); Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability for Client Fraud, 1991
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1 (quoting Judge Friendly’s opinion in Benjamin).
23. Benjamin, 328 F.2d at 856.
24. Id. at 857.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1) (1964).
26. Benjamin, 328 F.2d at 857.
27. See id. at 857–60 (describing Benjamin’s activities).
28. See id. at 863 (“[Benjamin] must have known that control of the corporation . . . was
being acquired by Mende and that the statute explicitly denied exemption to any new offerings
by persons in control, a limitation of which his testimony before the SEC showed he was well
aware.”).

SMITH IN PRINTER PROOF

506

10/17/2010 10:33:48 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:499
29

A second case, United States v. Cavin, demonstrates how
criminal fraud statutes avoid the potential for disagreement between
the criminal law’s and the professional rules’ basic doctrines of
complicity. In Cavin, the trial court held an associate at a New
Orleans law firm liable as a co-conspirator in a scheme to defraud the
30
state insurance regulator. The associate, Gerald Daigle, Jr., advised
31
David Ridgeway in Ridgeway’s efforts to start an insurance business.
Daigle reviewed documentation submitted to the Louisiana insurance
regulators and advised Ridgeway on compliance with the regulators’
requirement that the insurance company maintain a sufficient capital
balance to pay out claims by policyholders. He also actively assisted
32
Ridgeway in obtaining funds for the insurance venture.
Contrary to the statements that Daigle submitted to the
insurance regulators, the assets were not owned by Ridgeway but
33
were borrowed. Although Daigle had been involved in orchestrating
34
several of the loan transactions, he insisted at trial that he could not
have acted with fraudulent intent because he did not understand that
the assets were disqualified from fulfilling the regulator’s capital35
balance requirement. But the court found sufficient evidence that
Daigle knew the assets were disqualified and that he acted with the
36
purpose to defraud the insurance regulator. This proof of Daigle’s
knowledge established his guilt because it excluded the possibility
that he had acted in good faith.
Cavin and Benjamin illustrate that fraud statutes reconcile the
criminal law’s and the professional rules’ versions of complicity by
adding mens rea elements that require some degree of knowledge
that the act in question is illegal. By imposing this requirement, the
fraud statutes guide judicial analysis to a result that excludes the
possibility that a guilty defendant acted in good faith. The anti-fraud
29. United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir. 1994).
30. Id. at 1304.
31. Id. at 1302 (“Ridgeway’s efforts were assisted professionally by Daigle, an associate
soon to become a partner at a prestigious New Orleans law firm.”).
32. See id. at 1302–04 (describing Daigle’s activities).
33. Id. at 1303 (“To replace the $1 million . . . Ridgeway entered into a stock rental
transaction. . . . [Ridgeway] reported [the stock] to the Commissioner as an unencumbered
asset.”).
34. Id. at 1303–04 (describing Daigle’s involvement in a sham stock-rental transaction and
securities purchase).
35. Id. at 1306 (“Daigle maintains that the status of these so-called ‘rental assets’ was
unclear at the time and therefore he lacked fraudulent intent . . . .”).
36. See id. at 1306–07 (outlining evidence suggesting Daigle’s knowledge and purpose).
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rules offer an example of how the criminal law can accommodate the
professional rules’ protection for advice given in good faith.
II. THE ADVISING-ADVOCACY DISTINCTION AS A
MEASUREMENT OF COMPLICITY
The requirement of fraudulent intent that preserves fraud
prosecutions’ consistency with the professional rules’ good-faith
standard does not exist in all conceptions of lawyers’ complicity. The
critical responses to three crises in the legal profession invoked a
different norm for lawyers’ complicity that casts the advising lawyer
as an accomplice when the lawyer has confused the responsibilities of
an advisor with the role of an advocate before the court. While these
criticisms present a viable concept of lawyers’ complicity, unlike the
criminal prohibitions on fraud, this concept of complicity lacks
specific mens rea requirements that reconcile the criminal law’s
doctrine of complicity with the professional rules’ exemption for
lawyers acting in good faith.
Neutrality figures prominently in the duties of the advisor,
whereas the adversarial process found in litigation relies upon zealous
37
partisanship. But the systemic protections afforded by the
adversarial process disappear in the context of the lawyer’s advising
role, since no opposing counsel or neutral arbiter acts as a check on
38
partisan representation. In the advising context, the lawyer is
expected to present the client with the potential risks involved in
39
adopting a given course of action. Bias in favor of the client’s
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009) (“In advising a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.”); HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 8, § 23.2 (noting that Rule 2.1 prohibits the lawyer from “play[ing]
sycophant” to a client seeking to “have her own preconceptions confirmed rather than seek
genuine advice”); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 53–58 (2000) (presenting and critiquing the traditional justifications
for the adversary system); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 564 (1986)
(summarizing the features of the adversary system).
38. See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958) (“Partisan advocacy plays its essential part in
[litigation], and the lawyer pleading his client’s case may properly present it in the most
favorable light. A similar resolution of doubts in one direction becomes inappropriate when the
lawyer acts as counselor.”).
39. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.”); HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 7.4 (“[Under Rule 1.4(b),] a lawyer must
arm clients with the information necessary for making important decisions about the
representation . . . .”).
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preferred course of action would undermine the integrity of the
40
lawyer’s advice.
The controversies surrounding the “torture memos” issued by
the Office of Legal Counsel; Vinson & Elkins’ role in the Enron
scandal; and Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler’s (Kaye
Scholer) representation of Lincoln Savings & Loan (Lincoln) in an
examination by a federal bank regulator involve lawyers who were
subsequently criticized for having been complicit in illegal conduct.
This Part isolates the common elements of each of these criticisms to
delineate the concept of complicity that emerged in each case. This
Part concludes that, according to these critics’ concepts of complicity,
the distinction between advising and advocacy constitutes an
important element in determining when a lawyer ceases to act as an
advisor and becomes an accomplice.
A. The Torture Memo Controversy
In a series of memoranda written in 2002 and 2003, attorneys in
the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) created
the framework for the Department of Defense and Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) interrogations of prisoners held in Iraq,
41
Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Although then–Assistant
Attorney General Jay Bybee signed all but one of the memos, they
42
were drafted primarily by John Yoo, an influential member of the
OLC who espoused expansive views of presidential power in
43
wartime. Together, the opinions authored by Yoo eliminated the
legal restraints upon the treatment of individuals held by the CIA and
44
the Department of Defense imposed by the Geneva Conventions,

40. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 23.2 (“A lawyer’s duty to exercise independent
professional judgment may be threatened not only by ‘others’ but by clients as well; a client may
consult a lawyer to have her own preconceptions confirmed rather than to seek genuine
advice.”).
41. See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS 3–360 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dreitel
eds., 2005) (containing memoranda composed by OLC attorneys).
42. See S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., 110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF
DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY, at xv–xvi (Comm. Print 2008) (describing the drafting of the
memos).
43. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 22–23 (2007) (introducing Yoo as an “OLC deputy with authority to
issue legal opinions that were binding throughout the executive branch”).
44. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., OLC, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, U.S.
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the Torture Convention, customary international law, the Fifth and
47
Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, U.S. federal law of
48
general applicability, U.S. federal law applicable only in special
49
50
federal jurisdictions, and the U.S. Torture Statute and War Crimes
51
Statute. In place of these restraints, the memos left a construction of
the Torture Statute that prohibited only the most extreme forms of
52
treatment, which could be avoided by interrogators who asserted
53
that they acted out of “self-defense” or “necessity” and that, in any
event, would be unconstitutional as applied to interrogations ordered
54
by the president. According to the report of the Senate Armed
Services Committee on the treatment of prisoners held by the CIA
and the Department of Defense, the memos “distorted the meaning
and intent of the anti-torture laws” and “rationalized the abuse of
55
detainees in U.S. custody.” This deconstruction of the law turned
56
concrete legal limitations into manipulable policies that left field
commanders with little guidance as to the boundaries of permissible
57
treatment of detainees.
The most notorious of these memos, written in August 2002,
58
construed the provisions of the federal code that criminalize torture
to apply only to the infliction of “serious physical damage” that is
Dep’t of Def., Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees 9–10 (Jan.
22, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
45. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., OLC, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, at 14–22 (Aug. 1, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
46. Memorandum from Bybee to Gonzales and Haynes, supra note 44, at 32–37.
47. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., OLC, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Military Interrogation of
Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States 2–10 (Mar. 14, 2003) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
48. Id. at 11–47.
49. Id.
50. Memorandum from Bybee to Gonzales, supra note 45, at 4–5.
51. Memorandum from Bybee to Gonzales and Haynes, supra note 44, at 2–10.
52. Memorandum from Bybee to Gonzales, supra note 45, at 14–22.
53. Id. at 39–46.
54. Id. at 31–39.
55. S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., supra note 42, at xxvii.
56. See id. at xiii (“[T]he decision to replace well established military doctrine, i.e., legal
compliance with the Geneva Conventions, with a policy subject to interpretation, impacted the
treatment of detainees in U.S. custody.”).
57. See id. at xxiv (describing Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez’s issuance and withdrawal of
several official policies governing the treatment of detainees in Iraq).
58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340B (2006).
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equivalent to “permanent impairment of a significant body function,”
59
“organ failure,” or “death.” Shortly after being released by the
60
Washington Post in June 2004, the memos provoked a crisis in the
61
interpretation of the legitimate boundaries of legal advice. Although
a range of commentators—including legal academics specializing in
62
63
the law of war, lawyers at the State Department, congressional
64
65
investigators, and Yoo’s successor at the OLC —framed their
criticisms differently, much of the criticism of the memos centered on
the tension between the lawyer’s role as advocate and the lawyer’s
duties as advisor.
Critics took several different approaches to describing the wrong
Yoo committed in drafting the memos. One line of criticism held that
the memos failed to present a balanced view of the definition of
torture by taking extreme positions and failing to cite countervailing
59. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., OLC, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 41, at 176.
60. See Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J.
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 455, 462–63 (2005) (“The legal analysis in the [August 2002]
[m]emorandum was so indefensible that it could not—and did not—withstand public scrutiny.”);
see also Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics Is Disavowed, WASH.
POST, June 23, 2004, at A1 (reporting the withdrawal of the August 2002 memorandum); David
Ignatius, Op-Ed., Small Comfort, WASH. POST, June 15, 2004, at A23 (reporting the release of
the torture memo on the Washington Post’s website).
61. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 175, 176–77
(2006) (“When our high-level torturers act they do not do so by ignoring the law or acting extralegally but by systematic and reasoned misinterpretations of the law.”); Michael Hatfield, Fear,
Legal Indeterminacy, and the American Lawyering Culture, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 511, 515
(2006) (“[T]he legal profession’s response to [the August 2002 memo] has been an exceptionally
deep and widespread expression of dismay.”); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law:
Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1687 (2005) (“Reading the
memoranda of Judge Bybee and Professor Yoo . . . shook my faith in the integrity of the
community of American jurists.”).
62. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 61, at 186–98 (criticizing the memo’s conclusions under
the laws of war); Waldron, supra note 61, at 1693–95 (same).
63. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES
OF CRISIS 192–93 (2010) (relating former State Department Legal Adviser William Taft’s
reflection that the OLC memos arrived at “conclusions that were not consistent with our treaty
obligations under the Convention against Torture and our obligations under customary
international law”).
64. See S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., supra note 42, at xxvii (“[The August 2002
memorandum interpreting the torture statute] distorted the meaning and intent of anti-torture
laws, rationalized the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody[,] and influenced Department of
Defense determinations as to what interrogation techniques were legal for use during
interrogations conducted by U.S. military personnel.”).
65. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 43, at 144–51 (analyzing the flaws of the August 2002
memorandum construing the torture statute).
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66

precedents. As several critics noted, this failure to consider contrary
authority was compounded by the duties incumbent upon Yoo as an
advisor to the government. These critics maintained that the
obligation to provide a balanced assessment increases for a lawyer
advising the government when that lawyer’s views will not likely be
subject to review by a court, either because those injured by the
policy will lack standing to seek a remedy in court or because the
judiciary will defer to the executive’s claims of secrecy on grounds of
67
national security.
A second line of criticism, building on the first, drew upon the
concept that the government attorney has a heightened responsibility
to consider the full scope of potential harm that the government’s
contemplated course of action could cause to third parties. This
heightened duty is most acute when that course of action could result
in consequences that offend widely shared contemporary definitions
68
of morality.

66. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 61, at 185–86 (“[T]hese memoranda are advocacy briefs
by ‘can do’ lawyers but certainly not objective examinations of the current treaty obligations of
the United States.”); Clark, supra note 60, at 462 (“[T]he [August 2002] Memorandum presents
highly questionable claims as settled law. It does not present either the counter arguments to
these claims or an assessment of the risk that other legal actors—including courts—would reject
them.”); Neil M. Peretz, The Limits of Outsourcing: Ethical Responsibilities of Federal
Government Attorneys Advising Executive Branch Officials, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 23, 49–50
(2006) (“The government attorneys preparing the memos may have failed to meet their ethical
responsibility . . . to explore alternative perspectives and to ensure such perspectives were
represented during the policymaking process.”); see also Adam Liptak, Legal Scholars Criticize
Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2004, at A14 (surveying criticisms by prominent legal
scholars).
67. See Peretz, supra note 66, at 37–39 (“Legal advisors to policymakers should not
zealously advocate because it is unlikely that an equally zealous adversary will arise to oppose
them. . . . [T]here is often no adversary to counterbalance the government attorney’s
advocacy . . . .”). See generally WALTER E. DELLINGER, DAWN JOHNSEN, RANDOLPH MOSS,
CHRISTOPHER SCHROEDER, JOSEPH R. GUERRA, BETH NOLAN, TODD PETERSON, CORNELIA.
T.L. PILLARD, H. JEFFERSON POWELL, TERESA WYNN ROSEBOROUGH, RICHARD SHIFFRIN,
WILLIAM MICHAEL TREANOR, DAVID BARRON, STUART BENJAMIN, LISA BROWN, PAMELA
HARRIS, NEIL KINKOPF, MARTIN LEDERMAN & MICHAEL SMALL, PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 2 (2004), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/2004 programs
_OLC principles_white paper.pdf (“OLC’s analysis should disclose, and candidly and fairly
address, the relevant range of legal sources and substantial arguments on all sides of the
question.”).
68. See Jesselyn Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role of the Government Advisor in the
War on Terrorism, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 19–30 (2006) (propounding a “morally perilous
question” doctrine guided by the Eighth Amendment that triggers heightened duties for lawyers
advising the government); see also Hatfield, supra note 61, at 518–24 (discussing the role of the
author’s moral views in determining the content of the reasoning in the August 2002 memo); cf.

SMITH IN PRINTER PROOF

512

10/17/2010 10:33:48 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:499

Other criticisms were voiced in the language of mens rea
requirements found in criminal law statutes. The term “reckless”
appears in discussions of the memos to describe the state of mind of
the drafter in regard to the probability that the interrogation policies
69
addressed by the memos were illegal. Noted international law
scholar José Alvarez, for example, described the treatment of
international legal authority in the memo construing the torture
70
statute as “cavalier, even reckless.”
Each of these critiques corroborates a fourth line of criticism,
which maintains that Yoo mistook his role as an advisor to the
government for the role of an attorney representing a client in
71
litigation. In the former role, the attorney assists the client in
determining how the client may realize his or her intended purposes
in conformity with the law, whereas, in the latter, the attorney crafts
72
an argument that the client’s conduct falls within the law. Such a
mistake results when the lawyer transposes the duty of zealous

HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 23.4 (describing Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct as contemplating “a moral dialog between autonomous individuals”).
69. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 66 (reporting criticism by Cass Sunstein that the reasoning
in the August 2002 memo was “just short of reckless”).
70. Alvarez, supra note 61, at 186.
71. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 43, at 149 (relating criticism of the August 2002
memorandum that “[i]t reads like a bad defense counsel’s brief, not an OLC opinion”); Clark,
supra note 60, at 458 (“[The memo’s] assertions about the state of the law are so inaccurate that
they seem to be arguments about what the authors (or the intended recipients) wanted the law
to be rather than assessments of what the law actually is.”); Radack, supra note 68, at 27
(reporting criticism of a former Third Circuit Court of Appeals judge that “[t]he position taken
by the government lawyers in these legal memoranda amount[s] to counseling a client as to how
to get away with violating the law” (second alteration in original)); Vanessa Blum, Culture of
Yes: Signing Off on a Strategy, LEGAL TIMES, June 14, 2004, at 12 (quoting former OLC
attorney Bruce Fein identifying the “problem with” the OLC’s legal advice as being “that you
start out with a conclusion and then go put together the jigsaw puzzle that makes it legal instead
of looking for the most persuasive answer under the law”); Stephen Gillers, Tortured Reasoning,
AM. LAW., July 2004, at 65 (“As an advisor, a lawyer is not an advocate.”); Andrew Rosenthal,
Editorial Observer, Legal Breach: The Government’s Attorneys and Abu Ghraib, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2004, at A22 (“[A] more cynical approach [to the law] says that lawyers are simply an
instrument of policy—get me a legal opinion that permits me to do X. Sometimes a lawyer has
to say, ‘You just can’t do this.’” (quoting attorney Jeh Johnson)). See generally DELLINGER ET
AL., supra note 67, at 2 (“OLC should not simply provide an advocate’s best defense of
contemplated action that OLC actually believes is best viewed as unlawful.”).
72. See Fuller & Randall, supra note 38, at 1161 (“Partisan advocacy plays its essential part
in [litigation], and the lawyer pleading his client’s case may properly present it in the most
favorable light. A similar resolution of doubts in one direction becomes inappropriate when the
lawyer acts as counselor.”); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 691 (“[A] lawyer’s counseling
can serve as a mechanism of social control by performing the socially desirable function of
encouraging law compliance on the part of clients.”).
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representation from the litigation context to the advisory context. The
danger is that, in an excess of misplaced zeal, the lawyer will guide the
73
client into acting illegally.
B. The Enron Scandal
As in the torture memo controversy, lawyers in the Enron
scandal were perceived by their critics as having facilitated crimes by
giving legal advice. According to these critics, Enron’s financial
collapse in 2001 was precipitated by a corresponding collapse of
professional competence and integrity among the lawyers advising the
74
company. In spite of the involvement of Enron’s attorneys at Vinson
& Elkins in approving transactions and the inadequate disclosures
75
that the Department of Justice later prosecuted as crimes, the
attorneys avoided public sanction. Due to the inability of the existing
76
professional standards governing the role of corporate counsel and
77
of the reporting obligations imposed by the securities laws to limit
the advisor’s participation in corporate misdeeds, commentators were
left without a clear standard for assessing whether the conduct of

73. See Clark, supra note 60, at 465–67 (contrasting the responsibility of advisors to provide
balanced legal analysis, or to caution their clients as to unbalanced aspects of their analysis, with
the liberty of advocates to assert non-frivolous claims).
74. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR., RAYMOND S. TROUBH & HERBERT S. WINOKUR,
JR., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 17 (2002) (attributing Enron’s failure to disclose its hedging
transactions with its affiliated entities in part to “an absence of . . . objective and critical
professional advice by outside counsel at Vinson & Elkins”); Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D.
Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 19 (2002) (“While questions
about [Vinson & Elkins’] exposure to malpractice suits remain open, the facts available suggest
that the firm was more than a bystander to corporate misconduct.”).
75. See Superseding Indictment, United States v. Fastow, No. H-02-0665 (S.D. Tex. Apr.
30, 2003), 2003 WL 22331356 (charging Enron executives with 109 counts of fraud, conspiracy,
obstruction of justice, and other crimes); POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 25–26, 44, 51, 65, 72,
100, 115, 158, 178, 181, 183, 187, 190 (documenting Vinson & Elkins’ involvement in
transactions and disclosure that became the subject of the indictments against Enron
executives).
76. See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After
Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1207–15 (2003) (proposing a new conception of the corporate
advisor’s role in response to the Enron scandal); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 498–504 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the flaws in traditional notions of the
lawyer’s counseling role).
77. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.), passed in response to the Enron scandal,
imposed new requirements requiring lawyers to report “evidence of a material violation of
securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty” to the chief legal counsel or board of directors. Id. §
307, 116 Stat. at 784.
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Enron’s lawyers amounted to ethical or criminal violations. The
perception that the lawyers’ failure to provide “objective and critical
79
80
professional advice” facilitated the company’s crimes provides
another opportunity to distinguish between appropriate advising and
81
advocacy that turns the advisor into an accomplice.
Although the Enron transactions that ultimately provoked the
82
ensuing scandal were highly complex, analysts who reviewed the
transactions after the scandal erupted recognized that they fell within
83
at least three basic categories. In one network of transactions, Enron
arranged the debt-financed purchase of a limited partnership by an
Enron-related entity without consolidating the partnership onto its
balance sheets, contrary to accounting rules that required
consolidation of investment partnerships that lacked adequate equity
84
capital. In another group of transactions, Enron transferred debts to
two partnerships managed by Enron executive Andrew Fastow
shortly before reporting periods ended, only to purchase them back
85
after the reporting period was over. In a third category, Enron used
the partnerships managed by Fastow to coordinate so-called hedging
transactions, in which Enron would acquire assets from investment
86
vehicles created by Enron using shares of Enron stock. Although
these exchanges involved no transfer of economic risk, the

78. See Rhode & Paton, supra note 74, at 17–24, 29 (describing the role of Enron lawyers
and noting a lack of “appropriate standards of third-party liability for lawyers who passively
acquiesce in client fraud” in the rules of professional conduct).
79. POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 17.
80. See id. at 26 (“Management and the Board relied heavily on the perceived approval by
Vinson & Elkins of the structure and disclosure of the transactions. Enron’s Audit and
Compliance Committee, as well as in-house counsel, looked to it for assurance that Enron’s
public disclosures were legally sufficient. . . . Vinson & Elkins should have brought a stronger,
more objective and more critical voice to the disclosure process.”); see also Gordon, supra note
76, at 1216 (describing the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley “status quo” as one in which “lawyers effectively
facilitate, or passively acquiesce in and enable corporate frauds, in the name of a noble idea of
advocacy that has been ludicrously misapplied”).
81. See Gordon, supra note 76, at 1204 (criticizing the use, as a defense of the Enron
lawyers’ conduct, of the notion of the corporate lawyer as “adversary-advocate”).
82. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE
SCANDALS: FROM ENRON TO REFORM 99 (2006) (“The list of complex Enron structured
finance transactions is simply too long to examine in any depth.”).
83. See POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 6–17 (reporting findings on the “Chewco”
transaction and the “LJM,” “hedging,” and “asset sale” transactions).
84. See id. at 6–7 (summarizing the structure and accounting implications of the Chewco
transaction).
85. See id. at 11–12 (summarizing Enron’s asset sale transactions).
86. See id. at 13–17 (summarizing issues raised by the hedging transactions).
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investments received by Enron were reported as bona fide earnings.
When Enron finally restated its earnings in 2001 to comply with
accounting rules, the firm reduced its reported net income by nearly
88
twenty percent over the previous four years.
Attorneys at Vinson & Elkins advised Enron on each of the
transactions that became the focus of the subsequent criminal
89
prosecutions of the company’s executives. The law firm also advised
the company on compliance with its obligations to disclose
information about these transactions to the Securities and Exchange
90
Commission. After Enron Vice President Sherron Watkins raised
concerns with Chairman Kenneth Lay about the legality of the
hedging transactions, the company hired Vinson & Elkins to review
its compliance with its disclosure obligations, even though the law
91
firm had advised Enron on these disclosures initially. In its
subsequent nine-page report, the law firm concluded that the
92
company’s actions required no further investigation. Although the
law firm knew the details of Enron’s hedging activities due to its role
93
in advising Enron on its disclosure obligations, the firm’s report

87. See id. at 14–15 (describing abuses of accounting standards involved in the hedging
transactions).
88. See id. at 3 (describing the financial consequences of Enron’s restatement of earnings).
89. See Superseding Indictment, supra note 75, ¶¶ 10–47 (providing a factual basis for
charges related to Enron executives’ use of the fraudulent hedging transactions); see also
POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 44, 51, 66, 72, 100, 115, 154, 178, 181, 183 (noting Vinson &
Elkins’ involvement in advising Enron on the Chewco, asset sale, and hedging transactions).
90. POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 26 (“[Vinson & Elkins] also assisted Enron with the
preparation of its disclosures of related-party transactions in the proxy statements and the
footnotes to the financial statements in Enron’s periodic SEC filings.”).
91. See id. at 172–77 (discussing Watkins’ objections and the decision to hire Vinson &
Elkins). The decision to hire Vinson & Elkins and the firm’s decision to take the job were made
in spite of the fact that the firm would be reviewing its own work. Rhode & Paton, supra note
74, at 20 (“In agreeing to take on this investigation, Vinson & Elkins opened itself to
accusations that it would be evaluating its own work.”).
92. Destruction of Enron-Related Documents by Andersen Personnel: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th
Cong. 46–54 (2002) (letter from Max Hendrick, III, Partner, Vinson & Elkins LLP, to James V.
Derrick, Jr., Executive Vice President & General Counsel, Enron Corp.) (containing Vinson &
Elkins’ report and recommendations).
93. See POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 25–26, 115, 182–83 (describing Vinson & Elkins’
role as providing “substantial advice” on the disclosures of transactions with Enron’s affiliated
entities).
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dismissed illegal aspects of the transactions as nothing more than
94
“[b]ad [c]osmetics.”
The Special Investigative Committee commissioned by the
Enron Board of Directors issued a report (the Powers Report)
refuting the law firm’s conclusions, finding that the firm’s review was
“structured with less skepticism than was needed to see through these
95
particularly complex transactions.” Summarizing its conclusions, the
Special Investigative Committee attributed the corporation’s failure
to abide by its disclosure obligations in part to “an absence
of . . . objective and critical professional advice by outside counsel at
96
Vinson & Elkins.” The publication of the Powers Report marked
the beginning of speculation about whether the lawyers’ role as
Enron’s advisor on the hedging transactions would expose them to
97
criminal liability. As one commentator framed the question, “Were
V&E’s lawyers co-conspirators? Or were they merely scribes who
unknowingly drafted documents that helped Enron fleece its
98
shareholders?” But the $30 million settlement reached by Vinson &
Elkins with Enron’s bankruptcy trustee in 2006 ensured that, in the
absence of a criminal investigation, the scope of the lawyers’
99
complicity would remain a mystery.
When considered with the torture memo controversy, Vinson &
Elkins’ role in Enron’s attempts to evade and abuse corporate
accounting rules offers a second case in which lawyers were perceived
as complicit in illegal conduct based on their failure to provide
100
“objective and critical professional advice.”
The Special
Investigative Committee’s criticism of Vinson & Elkins’ failure to
94. Destruction of Enron-Related Documents by Andersen Personnel: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, supra
note 92, at 53.
95. POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 177.
96. Id. at 17.
97. See, e.g., Dan Ackman, Enron’s Lawyers: Eyes Wide Shut?, FORBES.COM (Jan. 28,
2002, 12:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2002/01/28/0128veenron.html (noting that “plaintiffs
and prosecutors could argue V&E ‘turned a blind eye’ . . . and use the [Vinson & Elkins report]
to draw the lawyers even deeper inside the Enron circle” (quoting Richard Epstein, Professor,
University of Chicago)); Mike France, Commentary, Close the Lawyer Loophole, BUS. WK.,
Feb. 2, 2004, at 70, 70 (“Corporate lawyers are almost never sent to jail for helping out whitecollar criminals.”).
98. Michael Orey, Lawyers: Enron’s Last Mystery, BUSINESSWEEK.COM (June 1, 2006),
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/may2006/pi20060531_972686.htm.
99. See Ex-Enron Law Firm to Pay $30 Million, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2006, at C5 (reporting
on the settlement with Enron).
100. POWERS ET AL., supra note 74, at 17.
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adopt the necessary degree of skepticism toward their client’s
activities mirrors the criticisms of the torture memos’ failure to
“provide objective legal advice” in analyses that “seem[ed] to be
arguments about what the authors . . . wanted the law to be rather
101
than assessments of what the law actually is.” Critics in both cases
used the apparent bias in the lawyer’s advice as a criterion for
determining whether the lawyer was complicit in the client’s conduct.
This method of evaluating lawyers’ advice appeared again in the
Lincoln Savings & Loan investigation.
C. Kaye Scholer and the Lincoln Savings & Loan Investigation
As in the torture-memo and Enron controversies, the
enforcement action brought by the Office of Thrift Supervision
102
(OTS) against the law firm Kaye Scholer provoked fundamental
questions about the nature of a lawyer’s complicity in a client’s illegal
conduct. At issue in the disagreement between the firm’s defenders
and supporters of the enforcement action were the limits on a
lawyer’s liberty to present unfavorable facts in a favorable light when
representing a client before a federal bank regulator. The law firm
claimed that it represented Lincoln in an adversarial setting similar to
litigation that justified its attempt to shade the facts in the manner
103
most favorable to the client. The OTS charged that this practice
violated federal banking regulations that provided penalties for
knowingly making false or misleading statements to the Federal

101. Compare, e.g., id. (attributing Enron’s failure to comply with its disclosure obligations
in part to the “absence of . . . objective and critical professional advice by . . . Vinson & Elkins”),
with Clark, supra note 60, at 458 (“The [August 2002] memorandum purported to provide
objective legal advice . . . . Nevertheless, its assertions about the state of the law are so
inaccurate that they seem to be arguments about what the authors . . . wanted the law to be
rather than assessments of what the law actually is.”).
102. See Notice of Charges and of Hearing for Cease and Desist Orders to Direct
Restitution and Other Appropriate Relief; Notice of Intention to Remove and Prohibit from
Participation in the Conduct of the Affairs of Insured Depository Institutions; Notice of
Intention to Debar from Practice Before the Office of Thrift Supervision, In re Fishbein, OTS
AP-92-10 (Mar. 1, 1992), reprinted in JONATHAN J. LERNER, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP AFTER KAYE, SCHOLER 237 (1992).
103. See Steve France, Just Deserts: Don’t Cry for Kaye, Scholer, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 6,
1992, at 28 (quoting Kaye Scholer’s defense attorney’s observation that the firm defined its
obligations in terms of litigation because that characterization provided the “‘broadest
leeway’ . . . to ‘characterize facts in a light favorable to the client and even withhold damaging
information, unless required by law to provide it’”).
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104

Home Loan Bank Board. The distinction between the lawyer’s role
in advocacy and the lawyer’s role in nonlitigation settings became the
crux of the disagreement between commentators who supported and
opposed the OTS investigation.
Kaye Scholer went to work for Lincoln in 1986, by which time
the bank had become heavily steeped in the late-1980s savings-and105
loan crisis. The Kaye Scholer litigators took a highly aggressive
stance toward the regulators’ inquiries into the bank’s liquidity,
describing Lincoln as an “extraordinarily successful, financially
106
healthy institution,” despite the firm’s knowledge that the bank had
inflated its earnings through sham transactions, backdated
investments to take advantage of grandfather clauses in banking
regulations, and fabricated documents to mislead investigators about
107
the bank’s underwriting process.
The OTS complaint resulted in a forty-one-million-dollar
settlement against the law firm and an injunction prohibiting two of
108
its partners from practicing before bank regulatory authorities. The
109
firm never admitted any wrongdoing; on the contrary, it maintained
that its attorneys had acted within the limits proper to “litigation
110
counsel” in an adversarial proceeding.
The critics of Kaye Scholer’s activities in its representation of
Lincoln drew on the distinction between advising and advocacy to
arrive at a notion of a lawyer’s complicity in a client’s illegal activity.

104. See William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and the
Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243 app. (1998)
(summarizing the OTS charges and the law firm’s responses); see also Susan Beck & Michael
Orey, They Got What They Deserved, AM. LAW., May 1992, at 68, 74 (characterizing Kaye
Scholer’s argument that they acted in the role of “litigation counsel” as “an attempt to avoid
being charged under . . . [t]he bank board reg[ulation] in effect at the time”).
105. See Simon, supra note 104, at 246–48 (providing background on the financial climate
surrounding the Lincoln investigation).
106. Beck & Orey, supra note 104, at 68.
107. See Simon, supra note 104, at 248–51 (describing the OTS charges against Kaye
Scholer); Beck & Orey, supra note 104, at 71 (“[N]umerous internal Kaye, Scholer memos
describe in vivid detail problems with Lincoln’s operations . . . . To the OTS looking for
evidence that Kaye, Scholer knew about Lincoln’s problems and helped its client hide them,
these documents must have looked like smoking guns.”).
108. France, supra note 103 (describing the terms of the settlement against the law firm and
the court order against the Kaye Scholer partners who directed the firm’s response to the OTS
investigation).
109. David Margolick, Lawyers Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1992, at A1.
110. See Beck & Orey, supra note 104, at 74 (reporting the firm’s use of the “litigation
counsel” argument in its public statements).
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Commentators who defended the law firm’s conduct heaped criticism
111
on the OTS enforcement action, asserting that it improperly
112
infringed upon the lawyers’ duty of loyalty to their client. Analysts
who supported the enforcement action expressed grave doubts about
the law firm’s assertion that it represented the bank in an adversarial
113
setting similar to litigation. According to one critic, “one prominent
claim in the Kaye Scholer debate was extremely radical. This was the
firm’s . . . argument that because the firm was ‘litigation’ rather than
‘regulatory’ counsel, it had a lower standard of responsibility to the
114
Bank Board.” In the conflict between these opposing views, the
advocacy-centered conception of the lawyer’s undivided adherence to
115
the client’s interests and emphasis on the litigator’s duty of zealous
116
advocacy collided with allegations that the Kaye Scholer lawyers
were central figures in a “picture . . . of a client rotten to the core and
117
a law firm that knew it.”
In the torture-memo controversy, the Enron scandal, and the
Kaye Scholer investigation, the distinction between the lawyer’s roles
as partisan advocate and as neutral advisor assumed central
importance. Critics in each controversy focused on curtailing the
scope of permissible advocacy in contexts outside traditional litigation
118
settings. Despite substantial differences in the nature of the lawyers’

111. See, e.g., Edward Brodsky, The ‘Kaye, Scholer’ Case, N.Y. L.J., May 22, 1992, at 1
(criticizing the OTS’s “extraordinary action” in freezing Kaye Scholer’s assets during the
investigation); W. John Moore, Clubbing Counsel, NAT’L J., July 25, 1992, at 1714 (quoting
Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn partners’ position that the investigation “threatens to
fundamentally change the role of lawyers for, and the relationship of lawyers to, federally
insured financial institutions”).
112. See Amy Stevens & Paulette Thomas, Legal Crisis: How a Big Law Firm Was Brought
to Its Knees by Zealous Regulators, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at A1 (describing Kaye Scholer
partner Peter M. Fishbein “as a litigator who measured his professional worth under a code of
conduct that demanded unstinting loyalty to the client, [who] wasn’t about to let some
bureaucrat tell him otherwise”).
113. See Simon, supra note 104, at 270–73 (discussing the flaws of Kaye Scholer’s “litigation
counsel” argument); Beck & Orey, supra note 104, at 74 (“[The] biggest weakness [in Kaye
Scholer’s position] is its very premise, that this was a litigation, rather than a regulatory, setting.
Saying it was ‘litigation’ doesn’t make it so.”).
114. Simon, supra note 104, at 270.
115. See, e.g., Stevens & Thomas, supra note 112 (invoking the notion of “unstinting loyalty
to the client” as a defense of Kaye Scholer’s conduct).
116. See id. (questioning whether a lawyer’s role is “that of [a] zealous advocate for the
client”).
117. Beck & Orey, supra note 104, at 74.
118. See, e.g., Fred. C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice:
Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV.
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work in each case, commentators in all three cases used the
distinction between advice and advocacy to determine whether the
lawyers were complicit in their clients’ conduct. Although the critics
arrived at a similar conception of the lawyer’s complicity in each case,
that notion of complicity has yet to be described normatively under
the professional rules or the criminal law.
III. DISTINGUISHING THE PROFESSIONAL RULES AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW
The difficulty that critics experienced in articulating a general
standard of complicity in the torture-memo, Enron, and Kaye Scholer
cases stems from the fact that both the criminal law and the
professional rules are ill adapted to the problem of defining lawyers’
complicity in general terms. The basic doctrines in these two systems
remain in conflict over whether the lawyer who acts in a “good faith
effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the
120
law” should be excused. As this Part argues, a general standard for
lawyers’ complicity that fails to accommodate the professional rules’
and the criminal law’s respective doctrines of complicity would be
undesirable because both systems embody important considerations
for regulating lawyers’ behavior. At the same time, neither system
adequately reflects the considerations that the other incorporates.
121
Instead, their basic constitutive elements differ radically.
A. Origins of the Norms
The legal profession regulates lawyers’ conduct through
disciplinary agencies administered by bar organizations or by

829, 855 (2002) (“[T]he Kaye, Scholer incident called into question the codes’ paradigm of
lawyers as advocates.” (footnote omitted)); Gillers, supra note 71, at 65 (“As an advisor, a
lawyer is not an advocate.”).
119. This convergence is particularly notable in light of the disparate roles played by the
lawyers in each case. The Kaye Scholer attorneys mediated between Lincoln Savings & Loan
and a federal banking regulator, Vinson & Elkins advised on Enron’s compliance with its
disclosure obligations regarding transactions that were structured by the law firm, and the
torture memos were penned by a government attorney interpreting the limitations imposed on
interrogations of detainees held by the CIA and the military.
120. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009). For a discussion of these
doctrines, see supra Introduction.
121. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389,
1409–27 (1992) (discussing how the law and the professional rules advance different conceptions
of the lawyer’s role and appropriate behavior).
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independent state agencies. Although each state bar configures its
professional-discipline system differently, standards promulgated by
the American Bar Association (ABA) have influenced both the
substantive rules for lawyer discipline and the procedures for
123
administering these rules. The ABA standards impose sanctions for
violations of a lawyer’s duties to clients, to the public, to the legal
124
In most jurisdictions, a bar
system, and to the profession.
disciplinary agency hears allegations of lawyer misconduct and then
brings a complaint upon finding sufficient preliminary evidence of
125
misconduct.
The hearing “is a relatively formal version of
administrative law procedure,” and the lawyer is afforded procedural
guarantees such as assistance of counsel, limited discovery, and the
126
right to subpoena and cross-examine witnesses. The authority of the
bar agency to bring these complaints and of the courts to hear them
derives from the traditional assertion by the courts of an inherent
127
authority to regulate the conditions of legal practice.
The standards of professional discipline reflect the legal
128
profession’s view of the limits of permissible conduct by lawyers.
The judgments of wrongdoing and the consequences assigned to these
wrongful acts originate with the members of the profession, acting
129
without input from or modification by the general public. Although
a primary goal of the professional-discipline system is to protect the
122. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 76, at 951 (“[A]bout half the states have disciplinary
agencies that are nominally independent of the organized bar . . . .”).
123. See id. at 965 (“The ABA Standards are the most common source of guidance in the
sanctioning process.”).
124. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 1.1 (1992) (identifying
enforcement of duties owed “to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession” as
the purpose of disciplinary proceedings).
125. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK & ROGER C. CRAMTON, THE LAW
AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 918 (3d ed. 1999) (describing the use of a “preliminary
prosecutorial review to determine probable cause” in lawyer disciplinary proceedings conducted
in most jurisdictions).
126. Id. (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Cameron Beard, Comment, A Lawyer’s
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Professional Disciplinary Proceedings, 95 YALE L.J. 1060,
1066–67 (1987)).
127. See COMM. ON DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER
REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 1–9 (1992) (providing background in support of the
recommendation that the judiciary, rather than the legislature, should conduct professional
regulation of lawyers).
128. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. annot. (2007) (“The
Rules of Professional Conduct govern lawyer discipline.”).
129. See RHODE, supra note 37, at 145 (“Bar codes of conduct claim to protect the public,
but the public has had almost no voice in their formulation or enforcement.”).
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public from the peculiar forms of harm that lawyers can inflict, the
rules reflect the bar’s conception of the public’s interest in protection
from this harm, rather than the public’s assessment of its vulnerability
to lawyer misconduct and the appropriate norms and punishments
131
that regulate such behavior.
In contrast, publicly accountable legislatures enact criminal laws
132
through a process designed to reflect public attitudes. Although not
every piece of legislation successfully embodies these attitudes, the
criminal law as a whole may be expected to better reflect the public’s
133
views as a consequence of this public accountability.
B. The Interests Served
The criminal law and the professional rules differ in terms of the
interests that each system is intended to serve. Lawyers occupy a
134
135
position of privilege and responsibility in relation to the rest of the
public. Their tenure in this position continues with the permission of
136
the general public, which could curtail or eliminate this privilege at
any time. The professional-discipline system therefore serves the
130. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 1.1 (1992) (“The purpose of
lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect the public and the administration of justice from
lawyers who have not discharged . . . their professional duties.”).
131. See RHODE, supra note 37, at 143 (arguing that the legal profession’s “freedom from
external accountability too often serves the profession at the expense of the public”); Koniak,
supra note 121, at 1395–1402 (describing the law and the professional rules as distinct but
interdependent normative systems).
132. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 150 (1988) (“In
terms of structure, the combination of a representative conception, highly diverse training and
experience, and responsiveness and accountability to the citizenry on an ongoing basis provides
legitimacy to legislative rules . . . .”).
133. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (confronting the limitations on
the power of a political majority to use the criminal laws to enforce its moral views); JOEL
FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 100 (1970) (“[I]t can be said that punishment expresses the
judgment . . . of the community that what the criminal did was wrong.”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (Summer 1958) (“What
distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it . . . is the judgment of
community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”).
134. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS theoretical framework, para. 1
(recognizing that, by virtue of their expertise, lawyers have been given the power to make
certain types of decisions for the public).
135. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 1 (2009) (acknowledging that
lawyers have a “special responsibility for the quality of justice” in relation to the general public).
136. See id. para. 12–13 (recognizing that government regulation of the legal profession is
unnecessary “[t]o the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling” and
that failure to observe these obligations “compromises the independence of the profession”
(emphasis added)).
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interest of the profession in ensuring that the public does not become
so outraged by lawyers’ abuses of their privileged status that it
137
In this respect, the
curtails or eliminates these privileges.
professional-discipline system protects the legal profession from the
138
public as much as it protects the public from the legal profession.
The criminal law’s scope is broader: it serves the interests of the
public in enforcing behavioral norms that the public regards as
139
necessary to maintain the integrity of the polity. General public
norms and enforcement systems, criminal and otherwise, have a
superior status to the professional-discipline system because the legal
140
profession exists only by virtue of the presence of substantive law.
Thus, although both the professional-discipline system and the
criminal law are concerned with protecting the public’s interests, the
criminal law’s role is more primary.
C. The Subject of Sanctions
The professional-discipline system and the criminal law differ
also in the subject upon which each imposes sanctions as a
consequence of violating their respective norms. The most vivid
expression of the bar’s self-regulatory powers is its ability to limit a
lawyer’s permission to continue in the practice of law. The ABA has
approved a spectrum of sanctions, from private admonition and
limited probation at the lenient end of the spectrum to disbarment at
141
the severe end. These penalties exert their power over the lawyer

137. See WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 79 (“There is reason to think . . . that a strong
motivation for lawyer discipline is to reassure a doubtful public that notorious instances of
lawyer depredation are being handled appropriately.”).
138. See Zacharias, supra note 118, at 858 (“[O]ne of the ABA’s express goals in developing
professional regulation has been to supplant and obviate the need for regulation by lay
institutions.”); James C. Turner & Suzanne M. Mishkin, Time for a Whupping: Across the
Country, Attorney Discipline Systems Disgrace the Profession, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, at
58 (noting that the District of Columbia Bar Agency’s mission to “protect the public and the
courts from unethical conduct by” lawyers while also “protect[ing] members of the D.C. Bar”
requires disciplinary bodies to perform “conflicting missions”).
139. See Hart, supra note 133, at 410 (“[I]t is the criminal law which defines the minimum
conditions of man’s responsibility to his fellows and holds him to that responsibility.”).
140. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 5.12 (describing the professional rules’
incorporation of and deference to criminal norms). But see Koniak, supra note 121, at 1410
(observing that the public law may depend upon the legal profession for its existence as much as
the bar depends upon the law).
141. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 2.1 (1992) (defining the scope
of sanctions); RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 76, at 965 (“The ABA standards are the most
common source of guidance in the sanctioning process.”).
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through his or her license to practice law. In this respect, the
professional-discipline system’s sanctions address the lawyer’s license
and coerce the lawyer by limiting his or her permission to use that
143
license, while leaving more fundamental entitlements, such as
freedom of movement and civic participation, untouched.
In contrast, the criminal law exerts a coercive influence that
reaches deeper and more widely than the scope of professional
sanction. Instead of targeting the lawyer’s privileges as a lawyer, the
criminal law’s sanctions target the lawyer’s privileges as a citizen. As a
corollary of this wider spectrum of available penalties, the criminal
law can vindicate a broader array of social interests by imposing
144
reciprocal penalties in response to violations of those interests.
Moreover, because the criminal law’s penalties limit the individual’s
ability not merely to ply a trade but also to continue to participate in
the community, those penalties have a deeper coercive influence on
145
the individual. The criminal law thus exceeds the professionaldiscipline system in the breadth of interests it serves and the potency
of the penalties it imposes in response to violations of those interests.
D. The Purposes of Sanctions
In a section entitled “Purposes of Lawyer Discipline
Proceedings,” the authors of the draft ABA Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions asserted that courts do not perceive punishment as
146
the purpose of the disciplinary system. This perception is puzzling in
light of the similarity of the means and purposes of imposing
147
sanctions in the criminal and professional systems. According to the
142. The penalties imposed by lawyer disciplinary proceedings apply only to the lawyer’s
professional privileges. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS §§ 2.2–2.8 (listing
forms of sanctions).
143. Id.
144. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006) (instructing the sentencing judge to consider the
need for the sentence imposed “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”).
145. See Herbert Wexler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097,
1098 (1952) (“[P]enal law governs the strongest force that we permit official agencies to bring to
bear on individuals.”); cf. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347–48 (1971) (explaining that the
rule of lenity originates partly in recognition of the especially severe effects of criminal
punishment in constraining the individual).
146. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 1.1; see also WOLFRAM, supra note
37, at 81 (“Modern courts have repeatedly observed that ‘lawyer discipline is not intended to
punish the offending lawyer but to protect the public.’” (citation omitted)).
147. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 76, at 956 (“[M]uch lawyer discipline seems to fit
within the classic justifications of punishment: incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence.”).
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ABA Standards, an overriding purpose of the professional-discipline
148
system is to protect the public. As subsidiary purposes, this system
also seeks to protect the “integrity of the legal system,” to “deter
further unethical conduct,” to “rehabilitate” the lawyer being
sanctioned, and to “deter unethical behavior among all members of
the profession” through the example set by penalizing individual
149
lawyers.
This commentary confuses means with ends. Although
protecting the public and the legal system are appropriately viewed as
ends, the methods of deterrence and rehabilitation are better
understood as means of achieving these ends. Like the professionaldiscipline system, the criminal-justice system pursues the purpose of
150
public protection in administering penalties and uses the means of
deterrence and rehabilitation to achieve these ends. In both systems,
the fundamental aim of the imposition of a penalty is to realign the
individual’s behavior with the requirements of the normative
151
framework that the penalty enforces. In light of these substantive
similarities, the sanctions imposed by the professional-discipline
system should be recognized as a form of punishment to the same
extent as the sanctions imposed by the criminal law.
E. The Means of Enforcement
Standards for the professional conduct of lawyers are enforced
152
The ABA’s standards of
through state disciplinary systems.
professional discipline, which serve as the basis for the disciplinary
153
systems in most jurisdictions, are predicated on the theory that a
154
lawyer’s primary responsibility runs to the client. As a consequence,
the mechanics of the state professional-discipline systems are
148. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 1.1.
149. Id.
150. See SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1 (8th ed. 2007) (“The criminal justice system is society’s primary
mechanism for enforcing standards of conduct designed to protect the safety and security of
individuals and the community.”).
151. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 12 (“[C]riminal law[] aims to shape people’s
conduct along lines which are beneficial to society . . . .”).
152. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS preface, para. 2 (noting that
many states have adopted the ABA Standards and that the ABA’s Standing Committee on
Professional Discipline continues to assist state discipline systems in implementing the
standards).
153. See supra note 9.
154. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS theoretical framework, para. 3.
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designed primarily to vindicate the grievances of clients harmed by
155
lawyers’ misconduct.
The state professional-discipline systems’ reliance on complaints
by clients renders them incapable of dealing with situations in which
156
lawyers aid and abet their clients’ crimes. Because the client is, by
definition, the primary criminal actor, the client has no incentive to
refer the lawyer’s role as aider and abettor to the bar. Moreover,
because the practitioners who are most likely to have information
about the lawyer’s misconduct are the lawyer’s closest associates,
personal loyalties often deter other attorneys from referring cases to
157
the bar.
Bar counsel can obtain information from other sources that
mitigates this dependency on client referrals. In some states, for
example, bar counsel may initiate investigations independently,
although the lack of adequate resources frequently prevents them
158
from exercising this power. Consumer organizations also may detect
instances of misconduct or assist members of the public in submitting
159
complaints. But although these additional resources supplement
client complaints as sources of information about lawyer misconduct,

155. See RHODE, supra note 37, at 159 (“[B]ar agencies depend almost entirely on
complaints from clients . . . as a basis for disciplinary investigations.”); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 49–50 (1998) (describing duties owed to
clients); id. § 51 (limiting the range of nonclients to whom a lawyer owes a duty of care).
156. Cf. RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 76, at 952 (“[R]elatively few clients have sufficient
incentives or information to initiate disciplinary proceedings.”).
157. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS preface, para. 9 (“[In 1970],
[o]ne of the most significant problems in lawyer discipline was the reluctance of lawyers and
judges to report misconduct. That same problem exists today.”); HAZARD ET AL., supra note
125, at 927 (noting that the duty to report professional misconduct imposed by the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct “is widely ignored” among lawyers); RHODE, supra note 37, at 160
(describing a “‘there but for the Grace of God go I’ attitude” among judges and bar leaders that
deters reporting).
158. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 76, at 952. (“[D]isciplinary agencies are generally
underfunded and understaffed. . . . The absence of resources also prevents agencies from
undertaking independent investigations and limits the assistance that they can provide to
individuals who wish to file grievances.”).
159. See, e.g., Using a Lawyer: Don’t Hire a Legal Professional Before Reading this Book,
LEGAL REFORMER, Jan.–Mar. 2009, at 1, available at http://www.halt.org/the_legal_reformer/
2009/pdf/TLR-Winter09.pdf (advertising legal consumer resource providing information about
professional discipline). Civil society groups have referred complaints to state bar associations
about the conduct of lawyers involved in creating the United States’ interrogation policies under
the Bush administration, including John Yoo. See Justin Blum, Activists Seek Disbarment of
Bush Lawyers Over Interrogations, BLOOMBERG (May 18, 2009, 2:00 PM EDT), http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=washingtonstory&sid=aIpMTqMafwrw (reporting the
submission of complaints against Yoo and Jay Bybee).

SMITH IN PRINTER PROOF

2010]

10/17/2010 10:33:48 PM

ADVICE AND COMPLICITY

527

they cannot displace bar disciplinary agencies’ primary reliance on
160
client referrals.
In the absence of effective protections in the professionaldiscipline system against lawyers’ facilitation of their clients’ crimes,
the role of the criminal law in preventing lawyers from acting as
161
accomplices increases in importance. The imposition of criminal
liability upon lawyers acting as accomplices furthers the purposes of
both the criminal law and the professional rules, which prohibit
162
lawyers from assisting their clients in committing crimes. The lack of
incentive for lawyers and clients to refer cases to the bar, however,
severely hampers the bar’s efficacy in addressing cases where lawyers
act as accomplices. These structural shortcomings in the professionaldiscipline system distinguish criminal prosecution as the better
method of enforcing the prohibition on assisting criminal conduct.
IV. A GENERAL STANDARD FOR LAWYER COMPLICITY
The dissimilarity between the origins of the criminal law and the
professional rules, the means of their enforcement, the subject of
163
their sanctions, and the interests they serve raises the problem that
if one system operates without regard for the values embedded in the
other, the application of that system in individual cases might
164
undermine the values served by its counterpart.
Under the
professional rules, the concept of advising in good faith may shield
the lawyer from sanction, particularly if the advice was given in

160. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 76, at 949 (“[D]isciplinary complaint
processes . . . rely almost exclusively on clients as a source of information about ethical
violations.”).
161. Cf. RHODE, supra note 37, at 144 (“Without external checks, [lawyers who regulate
other lawyers] too often lose perspective about the points at which occupational and societal
interests conflict.”).
162. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009) (“A lawyer shall not counsel
a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent . . . .”).
163. See supra Part III.A–E.
164. See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327,
353 (1998) (“In some situations . . . there is a tension between the criminal law and professional
norms derived from other sources. In the rare case, this occurs because the criminal law
proscribes conduct that would otherwise be . . . required by professional norms.”); cf. Koniak,
supra note 121, at 1478–87 (describing conflicts between professional norms and the law);
Zacharias, supra note 118, at 870 (“[T]he failure to identify either the policies or reality of
disciplinary enforcement makes more difficult the task of coordinating discipline with other
methods of sanctioning misconduct.”).
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regard to a complex legal question; however, in most situations, the
basic doctrine of accomplice liability in the criminal law does not
166
recognize this legal mistake as a defense.
The torture-memo controversy, Vinson & Elkins’ role in the
Enron scandal, and the debate surrounding the OTS investigation of
Kaye Scholer call for a reconsideration of the standard of complicity
167
that applies to lawyers. Unless the professional-discipline system is
wrong to excuse the lawyer who advises in good faith, the standard of
complicity that developed in these cases must be refined to preserve
consistency with the professional rules’ exception for lawyers acting
in good faith.
A. The Advising-Complicity Standard
In the torture-memo, Enron, and Kaye Scholer controversies, the
distinction between the lawyer’s roles as advisor and as advocate
168
pervaded the commentators’ critiques. These critics’ distinction
between advice and advocacy separates the lawyer who influences a
client to commit a crime or facilitates a client’s criminal conduct from
the lawyer whose advice respects the limits that the law imposes upon
169
the client’s wishes.
The central challenge for courts and prosecutors in distinguishing
between appropriate advice and advocacy of criminal activity is
determining an evidentiary standard that can assist in evaluating
whether the lawyer intended to further the client’s illegal activity. A

165. See supra Part I.
166. See Kadish, supra note 1, at 346 (discussing the derivative nature of accomplice
liability).
167. See supra Part III.
168. Other commentators have analyzed this distinction using the language of “boundaries”
and “edges,” implying that the lawyer who blurs the distinction engages in misconduct. See, e.g.,
WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 692 (examining the obligations of lawyers advising their clients at
the “knife’s-edge limits of the law”); Joel S. Newman, Legal Advice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U.
RICH. L. REV. 287, 290 (1994) (“In substantive law cases, courts have struggled to draw the line
between mere advice, which does not involve the lawyer in criminal activity and liability, and
some further, active participation, which does.”); Michael E. Tigar, What Lawyers, What Edge?,
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 527 (2007) (proposing the distinction between advice and advocacy as
a “duality” that contributes to a definition of permissible and impermissible lawyer conduct).
This conception is also featured in some model rules. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 8 cmt. b (1998) (observing that a lawyer acting as an advisor
“may . . . cross the divide between appropriate counseling and criminal activity”).
169. Cf. Newman, supra note 168, at 290 (locating the “critical distinction” between culpable
and innocent advising activity referred to in Comment 6 to Model Rule 1.2 in the content of the
advice given by the lawyer).
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successful standard would address the evidentiary problem of
establishing what facts and circumstances provide evidence that the
lawyer intended to advance actions by the client that the lawyer knew
170
to be illegal. This Note proposes a standard for determining
whether a lawyer’s conduct crossed the boundary from advice into
complicity that focuses on three elements of the lawyer’s activity:
first, the lawyer’s knowledge of the client’s intended course of
conduct; second, the lawyer’s knowledge of the indeterminacy of the
171
law governing the client’s conduct; and third, the nature of the legal
advice provided by the lawyer to the client. If the legal advice is
highly imbalanced in relation to the lawyer’s knowledge of both the
client’s purpose and the indeterminacy of the law, this standard would
allow the inference that the advice could not have been intended to
aid the client in conforming to the law. Under these circumstances, a
jury could find that the lawyer intended to aid the client in
172
accomplishing the client’s criminal purposes.
This advising-complicity framework attempts to replicate the
success of the criminal law’s prohibitions of fraud by focusing judicial
analysis on elements of mens rea that effectively foreclose the
possibility that the lawyer acted in good faith. Just as proof of
173
fraudulent intent is necessary to sustain a fraud conviction, the
advising-complicity framework requires a combination of factors that,
if proven, tend to negate any claim of good faith. By requiring proof
of a mental state that precludes a finding of good faith, this
framework achieves the effect of the basic definitions of complicity
found in both the criminal law and the professional standards. It
embraces criminal norms to the extent that it provides a methodology
for determining the circumstances in which a lawyer intentionally
facilitates a client’s crime, while simultaneously incorporating the
interests of professional discipline by refining the analysis of the

170. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 225–27 (discussing proof of intent and
the doctrine of “presumed intent”).
171. Cf. WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 695 (identifying the elements of knowledge and legal
indeterminacy as principal factors in determining whether a lawyer intentionally engaged in
criminal conduct in violation of Model Rule 1.2(d)).
172. See id. at 693 (“[L]awyers can indeed be accomplices in crimes by giving their clients
legal advice for the purpose of aiding or assisting the client in a project known to consist of acts
constituting a criminal offense.”).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1306 (5th Cir. 1994) (requiring proof of
fraudulent intent to sustain a conviction of conspiracy to commit fraud).
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lawyer’s intent and thereby shielding from criminal liability the
lawyer who advises a client in good faith.
1. The First Element: Knowledge of the Client’s Intended
Conduct. To have the requisite mental state for accomplice liability,
the alleged accomplice must have had the intention to assist the client
174
in carrying out a criminal objective. Direct proof of intent is difficult
175
to obtain in the case of a lawyer acting in an advisory capacity.
Therefore, the factfinder must make an inference of the lawyer’s
176
intent to assist the commission of a crime from the circumstances.
The advisor who has been notified of the client’s proposed course of
conduct satisfies a prerequisite for accomplice liability, namely that
177
the accomplice know the goal pursued by the primary actor. The
lawyer’s knowledge in this situation enables the lawyer to better
assess the client’s motives in requesting the advice and to anticipate
178
how the advice will be used. In this position, the lawyer is able to
evaluate how an opinion on the legality of the client’s proposed
conduct must be written to steer the client away from illegal action.
Knowledge in this scenario is a question of degree. The extent of
the lawyer’s factual knowledge may vary from having no knowledge
at all of what the client intends to do, to having a basic understanding
of the range of possible actions the client is contemplating, to having
intimate knowledge of the details of the conduct in question, perhaps
because the client is already engaged in the conduct or because of the
179
lawyer’s involvement in planning it.

174. Kadish, supra note 1, at 346–49.
175. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 1.23 (“It is impossible to look into a lawyer’s
head, and it is unacceptable simply to take her word for her state of mind when the probity of
her own conduct is at issue.”).
176. See id. (“[C]ircumstantial evidence must also be the (sole) basis for inferring a lawyer’s
actual knowledge or belief . . . .”); see also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 226 (noting that a
criminal defendant’s intentions “must be gathered from his words (if any) and actions in the
light of all the surrounding circumstances”).
177. See Kadish, supra note 1, at 346–49 (discussing the accomplice’s intent to further the
primary actor’s goal).
178. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 5.13 (“[T]he problem [in providing advice on
suspicious activity] is to assess . . . the level of certainty that the client will actually misuse the
information.”); WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 696 (“A lawyer, on the basis of then known facts,
might legitimately begin a representation in furtherance of a client enterprise thought to be
lawful. If the lawyer later discovers facts indicating that the enterprise is unlawful, the latter
state of knowledge generates a new duty and the lawyer may no longer assist the client.”).
179. Cf. Hazard, supra note 16, at 672 (“It is sometimes suggested that . . . a lawyer cannot
‘know’ what a client intends. This suggestion is either disingenuous or absurd. . . . [T]he practice
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As the detail and specificity of the lawyer’s knowledge increases,
the lawyer’s understanding of how the advice must be tailored to
avoid illegal activity also increases. Moreover, as the extent of the
lawyer’s knowledge increases, the propriety of characterizing the
lawyer’s opinions as advocacy increases, because advocating a certain
course of conduct becomes more feasible as one’s understanding of
that conduct improves. Knowledge of the client’s intended conduct
constitutes one prerequisite to showing that the lawyer has crossed
the advising-complicity line.
2. The Second Element: Knowledge of the Risk of Illegality. The
second element required to demonstrate that the advising lawyer
acted as an accomplice is proof that the legal doctrine governing the
client’s activities alerted the lawyer to the heightened probability that
the client’s conduct was illegal. This element requires a factfinder’s
inference that the lawyer actually became aware of the risk of
180
illegality.
This element of the evidentiary standard assumes that, where the
legality of the proposed course of conduct poses a new question of
law or is otherwise highly contested or unclear, the lawyer would
understand that the need for balanced advice would be greater than if
the law were settled. A standard that requires the lawyer to provide a
more balanced view of the law in such instances is entirely consistent
with the lawyer’s duty to give the client a complete assessment of the
181
risk that the client’s conduct will be determined to be illegal. Failure
to discharge this obligation in spite of knowledge of the law would
corroborate the inference that the lawyer intended to assist the client
in acting outside the boundaries of the law.
A lawyer advising a client to engage in contemplated action that
is similar to crimes that are considered mala in se would also support
the inference that the advising lawyer was aware of the risk that the
182
conduct was criminal. Mala in se crimes—like burglary or murder—
of law is based on practical knowledge . . . . The question, therefore, is what degree of certainty
imposes legal obligations on one who ‘knows’?”).
180. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 1.23 (“Even where a violation requires proof of
[actual] ‘knowledge,’ the circumstances may be such that a disciplinary authority will infer that a
lawyer must have known.”).
181. See Clark, supra note 60, at 466–67 (discussing the advisor’s professional obligation to
advise the client of the potential that the client’s proposed course of conduct is illegal).
182. See Hazard, supra note 16, at 672 (“The narrowest connotation of illegality is conduct
violative of the criminal law that is mala in se. Although mala in se has no precise definition, it
generally comprehends conduct that any civilized society would regard as obnoxious . . . .”).
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are intuitively recognized as wrongful and were usually proscribed at
common law, in contrast with offenses that are wrongful simply
183
Criminal
because they are created by statute or regulation.
violations of jus cogens norms under international law, such as the
prohibition against torture, are also proscribed due to their
fundamental wrongfulness rather than their incompatibility with a
regulatory system and should be included among the crimes that are
184
considered mala in se. The similarity of the proposed conduct to
mala in se crimes would constitute notice for the lawyer that the
185
conduct in question was actually criminal.
3. The Third Element: Imbalance or Extremity in the Presentation
of the Legal Opinion. Whereas the first two elements of the
framework address the lawyer’s knowledge and therefore go to the
question of mens rea, the final element considers the lawyer’s actions
taken in light of that knowledge. The key determinant in this portion
of the advising-complicity analysis is the quality of imbalance in the
186
advice given by the lawyer. This element addresses the difference
between the advisor’s duty to present a neutral assessment of how the
law applies to the client’s proposed course of conduct and the
advocate’s license to argue the law in a manner that favors the
187
conduct that the client seeks to defend in court. The more
imbalanced the lawyer’s advice becomes, the less it retains the

183. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 32–35 (distinguishing mala in se
offenses from those that are mala prohibita).
184. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furund’ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 154 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (“[T]he jus cogens nature of the prohibition
against torture articulates the notion that the prohibition has now become one of the most
fundamental standards of the international community.”).
185. Cf. Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1578 (1995) (proposing a rule
making the malum in se status of a client’s proposed activity a factor in determining whether the
lawyer must refuse to give advice).
186. Cf. WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 692 (“[A] client may be impelled . . . to aggressively
push legality to its limits, and possibly beyond. It would be improbable that a lawyer could
perform the lawyerly function of advice-giving in such a situation in the same way in which a
lawyer advises on legally and morally unquestionable transactions.”).
187. See Fuller & Randall, supra note 38, at 1161 (“Partisan advocacy plays [an] essential
part [in litigation], and the lawyer pleading his client’s case may properly present it in the most
favorable light. A similar resolution of doubts in one direction becomes inappropriate when the
lawyer acts as counselor. The reasons that justify and even require partisan advocacy in the trial
of a cause do not grant any license to the lawyer to participate as legal adviser in a line of
conduct that is . . . of doubtful legality.”).
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188

neutrality implicit in the advisory role and the more it assumes the
189
bias inherent in advocacy. Of course, the more the lawyer’s work
resembles advocacy, the more it becomes appropriate to attribute to
the lawyer an intent to influence, induce, or provoke the client to
190
engage in particular conduct. Thus, the more the lawyer’s advice
resembles advocacy, the more appropriate it becomes to conclude
that the lawyer acted as an accomplice.
Determining whether the lawyer’s advice violated the advisingcomplicity standard depends upon the three factors discussed in this
Part. The question is whether, in light of the lawyer’s knowledge of
the client’s conduct and of the status of the law, the advice given by
the lawyer is so imbalanced as to support an inference that it was
intended not to assist the client in complying with the law but to assist
191
the client in violating it. An affirmative answer to this question
would indicate that the lawyer had breached the distinction between
advising and advocacy and participated as an accomplice in the
client’s illegal act.
B. Impossibility of Good Faith Under the Proposed AdvisingComplicity Standard
By requiring that the lawyer knew the client’s intended purpose
and knew that the law governing that purpose was ambiguous or
unsettled and yet gave advice that failed to warn of the probability
that the client’s conduct was illegal, the advising-complicity
framework adds to the criminal law’s basic doctrine of complicity by
requiring proof that tends to exclude the possibility that the lawyer
acted in good faith. In doing so, the framework replicates the effect of

188. See Hazard, supra note 16, at 671 (describing “unsuggestive advice” as “the least
instrumental form of assistance that a lawyer can provide a client” in pursuing an unlawful
objective).
189. See WOLFRAM, supra note 37, at 697 (“[A] lawyer must avoid replacing a sound
professional judgment about the limits of the law with a wished-for ambiguity in legal
proscriptions in a one-sided search for justification for a client’s dubious projects.”).
190. This advocacy, whether it is characterized as deliberate influence, inducement, or
provocation, amounts to more than mere “advice.” See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 60 (1975) (asserting that Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 7–102(A)(7), which prohibits lawyers from counseling or assisting their
clients in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal, requires “an active kind of participation in
the client’s illegal act, going beyond merely giving advice about the law”).
191. Cf. Clark, supra note 60, at 458 (“[The torture memo’s] assertions about the state of the
law are so inaccurate that they seem to be arguments about what the authors . . . wanted the law
to be rather than assessments of what the law actually is.”).
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fraud statutes, which impose mens rea requirements that exclude the
192
possibility that the defendant acted in good faith.
The lawyer would not be considered complicit in the client’s
crime if any of the proposed standard’s three required elements were
not met. If the lawyer did not have sufficient knowledge of the client’s
purpose to appreciate the risk that it was illegal, the lawyer would not
be complicit. Conversely, if the lawyer had intimate knowledge of the
client’s purpose but did not understand the controlling law, the
lawyer would not be complicit. Finally, even if the lawyer possessed
detailed knowledge of the client’s purpose and possessed expert
familiarity with the relevant law, if the lawyer gave advice that
warned of the risk that the conduct in question was illegal, no
inference of intent to further a criminal purpose could follow. Only
when all three elements are present could a jury determine that the
lawyer knowingly intended to facilitate a criminal act and convict the
lawyer as an accomplice to the client’s crime.
CONCLUSION
Formulating a general standard of complicity for the lawyer
acting in an advising role raises difficult problems in reconciling the
criminal law’s model of complicity with the professional rules’ excuse
for the advisor who acts in good faith. In spite of these difficulties, the
inconsistency between the standards of complicity in the criminal law
and the professional rules must be confronted if the different norms
and interests preserved by either system of rules are to remain
uncompromised. By developing a normative standard that draws on
the distinction between advice and advocacy to address the problem
of determining the lawyer’s intent, this Note has attempted to show
how the public’s interest in punishing harmful conduct according to
its own standards of culpability can be vindicated consistently with
the profession’s interest in discharging its traditional functions
without fear of sanction. If such a standard takes root, academic
critics, judges, bar disciplinary counsel, and prosecutors alike will
have a better method to distinguish innocent advising activity from
complicity in illegal or criminal conduct. Without a normative
standard in place, questions about the scope of lawyers’ complicity
that arose in the torture-memo, Enron, and Kaye Scholer

192. See supra Part I.
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controversies will remain unanswered, ready to surface again in some
future crisis.

